Maoist Attack on Dharmaram CRPF Camp Unraveled: Inside the Failed Operation
In a detailed account from surrendered People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) battalion commander Badise Sukka, alias Deva, the planned Maoist assault on the Dharmaram CRPF camp in January 2024 is revealed as a significant operational failure. What was intended as one of the largest coordinated strikes in recent years, involving nearly 400 armed cadres, ultimately collapsed into a night of confusion, technical breakdowns, and missed objectives.
Meticulous Planning and Initial Execution
The attack, scheduled for the night of January 16-17, 2024, was conceived as a full-scale siege by Maoist leadership. Four companies were mobilized under a structured command chain, with extensive planning and rehearsals conducted in the Palaguda forest. Weapons were serviced between January 4 and 8, and improvised explosive device (IED) components were prepared. From January 9 to 13, teams repeatedly rehearsed using a mock-up of the Dharmaram camp to familiarize themselves with the terrain and attack roles.
The assault was led by a senior command team, including slain leader Madavi Hiduma, alias Hidma, a central committee member who served as raid commander. Company commanders included Sodi Keshal, Badise Sukka, Muchaki Erral, and Jailal. On January 16, assault teams left their administrative base at 3:30 PM and reached concealed positions around the camp by evening. At about 7 PM, Hiduma ordered the advance, opening the attack with shelling.
Key Setbacks and Leadership Losses
A crucial objective was breaching the camp perimeter, but security forces were already alert and responded with heavy fire. A team led by first platoon commander Karatam Deva attempted to cut the fencing and force entry, but Karatam was killed, and the team withdrew. This loss removed a critical field leader and stalled the push to turn bombardment into an actual siege.
Deva's account provides a rare inside view of how a heavily planned insurgent operation can unravel under real battlefield conditions. Logistics, technology, leadership losses, and rapid counter-measures decisively reshaped the outcome within hours.
Turning Point with Security Countermeasures
According to Deva, the arrival of a mine-protected vehicle (MPV) from the nearby Chintavagu camp around 11:30 PM transformed the battle. The Maoist plan had included isolating Dharmaram by destroying the Chintavagu bridge with IEDs to prevent reinforcements, but the explosives never detonated. Trigger wires laid for the blast were reportedly severed when shells fired by Maoist teams themselves landed on them, leaving the bridge intact and allowing the MPV to cross.
Once inside, the vehicle gave security forces both mobility and protection, serving as a moving shield that enabled troops to advance and launch grenades at Maoist positions. Drones were also deployed to locate cadres, after which targeted fire and grenades were directed at those positions from behind the MPV's protection. Security forces simultaneously responded with sustained shelling from within and around the camp, causing the planned tight encirclement to slip beyond the attackers' control.
Equipment Failures and Morale Erosion
A second wave of setbacks came from within the Maoist ranks. Weapons malfunctioned, ammunition began running low, and improvised systems failed to perform despite days of preparation. One major blow involved a weapon known as the 'demolisher,' which misfired during the assault, killing a party member identified as Vikram. Combined with the earlier death of Karatam, this incident further eroded morale.
Despite repeated attempts by Hidma and other leaders to rally cadres, effective counter-fire proved difficult once security forces gained the advantage. By around 1 AM on January 17, the operation had clearly faltered, and Hidma ordered a full withdrawal. Units collected their dead and wounded and retreated towards a rendezvous point near Udathamalla village.
Aftermath and Investigation
The incident remains under investigation, with the National Investigation Agency filing a chargesheet in June 2025 against 17 accused—16 of them absconding—in connection with the attack. Within Maoist ranks, the setback was later described as a 'partial success,' but the reconstruction of events paints a starkly different picture: an assault that lost momentum early and gradually slid into retreat.
This failed operation highlights the challenges insurgent groups face when executing large-scale attacks against well-prepared security forces, where even meticulous planning can be undone by technical failures, leadership losses, and swift countermeasures.
