Delhi High Court Recognizes 'Alienation of Affection' as Civil Tort in Landmark Ruling
Delhi HC Recognizes 'Alienation of Affection' as Civil Tort

Delhi High Court Establishes 'Alienation of Affection' as Actionable Civil Tort in India

In a groundbreaking legal development that examines an emerging tort principle within Indian jurisprudence, the Delhi High Court has delivered a significant ruling affirming that civil suits seeking monetary damages from third parties for interfering in marital relationships and alienating a spouse's affection are indeed maintainable before Civil Courts. The Court has made it unequivocally clear that such claims are fundamentally based on tortious interference rather than matrimonial relief, thereby placing them outside the exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.

Judicial Order and Core Legal Principle

The landmark order was pronounced by Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav in the case of Shelly Mahajan v. Ms Bhanushree Bahl & Anr. In this proceeding, summons were formally issued to both the husband and the alleged paramour in a damages lawsuit founded upon the legal concept known as "Alienation of Affection" (AoA). The Court decisively rejected preliminary objections regarding the suit's maintainability, asserting that the plaint disclosed a legitimate civil cause of action warranting full adjudication at trial.

The Court meticulously articulated the governing legal principle as follows: "...a spouse is held to possess a protectable interest in marital consortium, intimacy, and companionship. The correlative legal duty mandates that any third party must refrain from intentionally and wrongfully interfering with that relationship through acts calculated to alienate the affection of one spouse from the other—an affection to which the aggrieved spouse is legally entitled."

Simultaneously, the judgment acknowledged the inherent autonomy within marriage, stating: "At the same time, a spouse retains the inherent liberty to make personal choices. Where the conduct of a spouse is completely voluntary, not induced and uncoerced, that exercise of such liberty by one spouse will defeat third-party liability." This nuanced approach balances protection of marital relationships with respect for individual freedom.

Background of the Dispute and Specific Allegations

The civil suit was instituted by the wife (the Plaintiff), who sought substantial damages on the premise that she was legally entitled to the affection, companionship, and consortium of her husband. She alleged that her husband had withdrawn this affection due to the intentional conduct of another woman who had entered into a close, intimate relationship with him.

The couple's marriage was solemnized in 2012. They were blessed with twin children in 2018 and were professionally engaged together within a shared family enterprise. The relationship between the husband and the other woman (the Defendants) reportedly developed after she joined a related business venture. This association gradually intensified through extensive travel and social interactions, persisting despite her clear awareness of the subsisting marriage.

The situation escalated dramatically in March 2023 when the wife discovered intimate remarks and letters exchanged between her husband and the other woman, providing clear evidence of an extramarital relationship. This was followed by their continued public association despite direct confrontation and family intervention. Subsequently, the husband initiated divorce proceedings. In response, the wife instituted this civil action seeking damages for alienation of affection, arguing that deliberate interference by the third party directly caused the marital breakdown.

Legal Objections to Maintainability and Court's Rejection

The defendants vigorously opposed the suit's maintainability, contending that the dispute stemmed from a marital relationship and thus fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. They further argued that allegations of adultery were already pending consideration in parallel matrimonial cases, making this suit an impermissible parallel forum challenge. The husband's counsel additionally invoked principles of personal autonomy and cited the Supreme Court's decision decriminalizing adultery to argue against judicial interference in private, intimate choices.

The Court dismissed these submissions at the threshold, holding that the alleged cause of action was fundamentally distinct from traditional matrimonial reliefs such as divorce or maintenance. Applying the established "cause of action" test from legal precedent, the Court clarified that this suit did not concern a matrimonial dispute but rather an independent tortious injury inflicted by a third party. It emphasized that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts cannot be excluded unless expressly or necessarily barred by statute.

The Court observed that the claim was framed as compensation arising from wrongful interference, not as enforcement of marital obligations, and therefore was not subject to Family Court exclusivity. The pendency of divorce proceedings did not preclude the damages claim, as the remedies pursued in each forum were legally distinct. The Court held: "The relief sought in this suit, i.e., compensation for tortious interference, is distinct from the remedies pursued under matrimonial law. Even if there is factual overlap, the Civil Court is competent to proceed..."

Doctrinal Examination and Legal Framework for Alienation of Affection

The Court conducted an extensive doctrinal inquiry into the history of this tort, noting that Indian law does not specifically codify "alienation of affection" and that the doctrine originates from Anglo-American common law 'heart-balm' actions. Referencing Supreme Court jurisprudence, it accepted that interference with marital consortium could technically constitute an intentional tort, while acknowledging that the doctrine remains underdeveloped in India.

The Court noted: "Although a third party may be instrumental in alienating the affection or companionship of a spouse, it is rare for the aggrieved spouse to pursue an action against such an intruder.... To date, no Indian Court appears to have granted relief in a civil suit seeking damages solely on the basis of AoA... the Courts have, thus far, not evolved any substantive law or remedies to support its enforcement in practice."

While emphasizing that English common law principles may have persuasive value in shaping Indian tort jurisprudence, the Court clarified that statutory developments in foreign jurisdictions do not apply proprio vigor, and domestic courts must evolve principles consistent with Indian constitutional and legislative frameworks.

Nevertheless, the Court found that theoretical acknowledgment of the tort, combined with convincing common-law principles, was sufficient to permit examination of such claims where pleaded facts disclosed intentional interference capable of causing compensable injury.

Analytical Framework and Threshold Requirements

Clarifying the analytical framework for such actions, the Court held that maintainability depends on whether the plaintiff can establish wrongful interference, causation, and measurable loss. It stated: "A civil action for wrongful interference in marriage is sustainable, so long as the plaintiff can... establish intentional and wrongful conduct... clear causation... and that the loss claimed is susceptible of rational assessment."

Elaborating further, the Court identified these requirements as forming the threshold structure governing such tort actions:

  1. Proof of intentional interference directed at the marital relationship,
  2. A demonstrable causal nexus to legally cognizable injury, and
  3. Loss capable of rational assessment through civil remedies.

This articulation formed the basis for allowing the suit to proceed beyond preliminary scrutiny.

Balancing Personal Autonomy with Civil Consequences

The Court further emphasized that recognition of personal autonomy following the decriminalization of adultery does not extinguish potential civil consequences, stating: "The decision in Joseph Shine decriminalised adultery; it did not create a license to enter into intimate relationships beyond marriage, free from civil or legal implications... such conduct may nevertheless give rise to civil consequences."

By striking a careful balance between personal freedoms and social norms, the Court recognized marriage as both a social and legal institution associated with norms of exclusivity. It observed that while individual liberty safeguards intimate decision-making against criminal sanction, civil law can still acknowledge injury resulting from violation of relational obligations when third-party intervention is alleged.

The Court reiterated that liability would not arise if the spouse acted entirely independently: "Where the conduct of a spouse is completely voluntary... that exercise of such liberty... will defeat third-party liability." However, factual determination of voluntariness versus inducement requires trial evidence and cannot be resolved at the summons stage.

Final Ruling and Case Details

The Court therefore conclusively held that the plaint disclosed a valid civil cause of action grounded in alleged tortious interference, distinct from matrimonial remedies and not barred by Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. Finding no statutory exclusion of jurisdiction and noting that the issue required evidentiary adjudication, it directed issuance of summons to the defendants while reserving their right to seek rejection of the plaint at an appropriate procedural stage.

Case Title: CS(OS) 602/2025 & I.A. 21712-21714/2025 - SHELLY MAHAJAN vs MS BHANUSHREE BAHL & ANR.

For Plaintiff: Ms. Malavika Rajkotia, Ms. Purva Dua and Mr. Mayank Grover, Advocates.

For Defendants: Mr. K.C. Jain, Advocate for D-1, Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, Ms. Tulika Bhatnagar and Mr. Sehaj Kataria, Advocates for D-2.